2021/04/13 – 30 Cdo 1926/2020 (summary)

Judgement of the Supreme Court of 13. 4. 2021, Ref. No. 30 Cdo 1926/2020
(Article 26 (1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, contesting international jurisdiction)

The claimant, commercial agent working for the defendant, sought payment of commission by the defendant company for trades made on the basis of his activities. The defendant company had a seat in Italy and therefore there was a cross-border element in the proceedings. The defendant company contested the jurisdiction according to Article 26(1), second sentence, of the Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (“Brussels I bis Regulation”), and claimed lack of international jurisdiction of the Czech courts. Both, the court of the first instance and the appellate court dealt with the question of international jurisdiction only in reasoning of the resolution (in Czech “usnesení”, a form of court decision) on declaration of local jurisdiction, and not in the operative part of the decision itself. The defendant company filed an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court. Firstly, the defendant argued that the lower courts had failed to rule on the objection concerning the lack of international jurisdiction of the Czech courts in the operative part of the decision. Secondly, the defendant argued that the lower courts had generally failed to deal adequately with the question of international jurisdiction (for example, the courts had not taken into account the defendant's arguments regarding the existing prorogation clause).

As to the first argument of the defendant, the Supreme Court stated that the Brussels I bis Regulation does not provide for the manner and form in which the court chosen by the claimant should review its international jurisdiction, leaving thus the detailed procedural arrangements to the individual Member States. The Supreme Court observed that the Code of Civil Procedure (Act. No. 99/1963 Coll.) does not contain a special provision expressly addressing the wording of the Article 26(1), second sentence, of the Brussels I bis Regulation, since a more detailed regulation of decision mechanisms for an unfounded objection of lack of international jurisdiction has been missing. However, it cannot be inferred from the above that the court is not obliged to rule on the objection of lack of international jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that this procedural situation concerns a (teleological) legal gap which should be filled per analogiam by a legal norm which is as close as possible in its meaning and purpose to the regulation directly related to the legal relationship at issue. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the gap in the procedural rules must be bridged by analogous application of the rule contained in Section 105(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure governing the decision on an unfounded objection of lack of local jurisdiction. According to this provision, if a court finds the objection of lack of local jurisdiction unfounded, the court will reject such objection by a decision in the form of resolution. An appeal or extraordinary appeal may be lodged against such decision. Such solution of the situation at issue reflects a consequent conclusion arising from the case-law of the Supreme Court, according to which the Brussels I bis Regulation regulates in certain cases, in addition to international jurisdiction, the question of local jurisdiction as well. The argument that the rejection of the timely objection of the lack of international jurisdiction should be decided in the form of resolution (its operative part to be precise) is also supported by the wording of Article 29 of the Brussels I bis Regulation (dealing with lis pendens). It can be derived from this provision of the Regulation that, at least in the case of identical proceedings pending parallelly before courts of several Member States, the international jurisdiction of the court with the earlier commenced proceeding should be determined in a qualified manner. As to the first argument of the defendant, the approach of the lower courts was incorrect when they assessed the question of the international jurisdiction of the Czech courts only within the reasoning of the decision in the form of resolution on declaring local jurisdiction and not in a separate operative part of the decision in the form of resolution. The Supreme Court concluded that an unfounded objection of lack of international jurisdiction pursuant to Article 26 (1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation should be rejected by a decision in the form of resolution (in its operative part).

As to the second argument of the defendant, the Supreme Court decided that the lower courts did not take into account in its decision the relevant arguments concerning the alleged conclusion of a prorogation clause which, if proved, would, on the defendant's timely objection, exclude the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Czech Republic. The Supreme Court thus deemed the extraordinary appeal to be well-founded on this point as well. The Supreme Court therefore quashed the decisions of the lower instance courts and remanded the case.